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A CIVILIAN’S REASON:                     
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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Robert Houghwout Jackson was a justice of the United States Supreme 
Court during the years of World War II.  This article considers his great but po-
tentially perplexing December 1944 dissent in Korematsu v. United States,1 in 
which he refused to join the Court majority that proclaimed the constitutional-
ity of military orders excluding Japanese Americans from the West Coast of the 
United States during the War years.2 
Japanese American internment history and the general public memory it 
shapes recall today that Justice Robert H. Jackson in Korematsu was, with his 
characteristic candor and gifted writing style, one of three—sadly, only three—
Supreme Court justices who recognized these military policies for what they 
were, who called them by their racist name, and who refused to assist in their 
enforcement by judging them to be authorized by the Constitution.  We recall 
much less often that Justice Jackson also wrote in Korematsu, with explicit res-
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 This article grows out of remarks I delivered on November 6, 2004, at the conference, “Judgments 
Judged & Wrongs Remembered: Examining the Japanese American Civil Liberties Cases of World War 
II on Their 60th Anniversary,” at the Japanese American National Museum in Los Angeles.  I am very 
grateful to the skilled leaders and personnel of the institutions that sponsored the conference—the 
University of North Carolina School of Law, the JANM, and the UCLA Asian American Studies Cen-
ter—and especially to UNC Law Professor Eric Muller, whose vision, boundless energy, and deep ex-
pertise made it an extraordinary event.  This article also reflects my September 26, 2002, participation 
in a Jackson Center conversation at Chautauqua Institution’s Lenna Hall with Fred Korematsu, his 
wife Kathryn Korematsu and documentary filmmaker Eric Paul Fournier.  I am very grateful to Fred 
and Kathryn Korematsu, Karen Korematsu-Haigh, Eric Fournier, Gregory L. Peterson, Scott McVay, 
Thomas Becker, Richard Redington, Elizabeth Lenna, and many others who made that special event 
possible.  I also thank Lauren DiFilippo, Melissa Peterson, Ann Carroll, and Jessica Duffy for excellent 
research assistance. 
Fred Korematsu, a wonderfully gentle man, was eighty-six years old when he died on March 30, 
2005.  As a token of  thanks for his lifetime of brave patriotism, I dedicate this article to his memory. 
 1. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 2. See id. at 242-48 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
06_BARRETT_FIXED PROOFS.DOC 11/22/2005  11:32 AM 
58 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 68:57 
ignation about judicial powerlessness, that civilian courts, up to and including 
his own Supreme Court, perhaps should abstain from attempting to hold mili-
tary commanders to constitutional limits in wartime. 
This article considers Justice Jackson’s Korematsu dissent in full.  It was and 
is, contrary to some of the criticisms it has received over the past 60 years, a co-
herent position.  (Readers can and should see this for themselves—reading this 
article is no substitute for reading Jackson’s compact six-page dissent.)  Jack-
son’s dissent is also biographical and, to that extent, deeply and personally 
pragmatic.  It emanated in part from his outlook and upbringing as quintessen-
tially a rural American civilian who viewed life as pacific and individually 
autonomous, and who saw our law as most workable in such times of peace and 
unthreatening personal freedom.  It was grounded as well in his very special, di-
rect, and formative experiences with executive power.  In the decade preceding 
his civilian judicial encounter with the military orders at issue in Korematsu, 
Jackson was very often a central player in exercising, and was constantly an up-
close witness to, the unstoppable nature of the Executive power that reaches its 
apex in military command.  Jackson’s Korematsu dissent also fit into his general 
view of people and power and into what he saw throughout his life as the idea 
of law itself:  it is the codified product of human beings struggling, by employing 
their rational and selfless capacities, to impose some limits on what they and 
their governments otherwise could perpetrate with the vast powers they pos-
sess.  And despite Jackson’s apparent institutional pessimism about the power 
of courts to protect constitutional liberties from military command threats dur-
ing wartime, his Korematsu opinion also displayed, and had as part of its bottom 
line, his characteristic optimism about U.S. democracy, from its smallest people 
to its most powerful leaders. 
In his years after Korematsu, Justice Jackson had unique experiences that 
confirmed his dissent’s perspective on the vast nature of executive—including 
military—power, and his hopeful view that the people who possess such power 
are capable of restraining themselves in its exercise.  At Nuremberg, in particu-
lar, where Jackson was the chief American military prosecutor of the surviving 
Nazi leaders following Germany’s unconditional surrender to the Allies, he 
worked closely with military leaders who exercised such restraint, and he him-
self functioned as—and tried with considerable success to live up to the respon-
sibilities of being—one of those powerful commanders. 
Jackson was never fully satisfied with his Korematsu opinion, but he knew 
two things from its writing in 1944 until the end of his life ten years later:  he 
had properly identified the unconstitutionality of defining crimes based on race, 
and his candor about the weakness of civilian judicial power as a limit on war-
time executive power was superior to any alternative judicial approach that his 
colleagues had offered or that he could imagine.  His dissenting opinion was, he 
knew, effective as a candid, smart consideration of perhaps the toughest chal-
lenge to civilian self-government:  the military commander’s wartime power. 
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For all of these reasons, Justice Jackson’s dissent in Korematsu v. United 
States merits its very high place in both the American legal and the human can-
ons.  The opinion—all of it—deserves to be studied, admired, and celebrated.  If 
it gets absorbed deeply by leaders who wield the vast powers of military com-
mand, Jackson’s words and his example may offer real hope that wartime lead-
ers will not, simply because they can, act to curtail individual liberty when it 
poses theoretical risks to ideals of physical and national security. 
II 
JACKSON’S KOREMATSU DISSENTING OPINION 
Although Justice Jackson was, like his senior colleagues Justices Owen J. 
Roberts and Frank Murphy, a dissenter in Korematsu, he earlier had been part 
of the unanimous Supreme Court that upheld, in Hirabayashi v. United States, 
the constitutionality of military curfew orders directed at West Coast Japanese 
Americans.3  Jackson’s dissent in Korematsu must thus be located in the context 
of his own development as a justice, for it marked a significant break from his 
previous judicial acquiescence in military measures that restricted the liberties 
of U.S. citizens at home.  As Professor Dennis Hutchinson has documented in 
detail, Jackson was late and skeptical in joining Chief Justice Stone’s opinion 
for the Court in Hirabayashi.4  But in those first years of World War II, in those 
early days of the Supreme Court’s considering the constitutionality of such dras-
tic wartime military measures, and in Jackson’s first years as a justice, he saw  
military curfew orders as understandable and, because of their relatively minor 
nature, constitutionally tolerable restrictions on civilian freedom.  Military im-
position of a nighttime curfew was for Jackson and each of the justices an in-
fringement on individual freedom that could be balanced against, and out-
weighed by, the military’s conviction that the curfew served a legitimate 
wartime security need. 
By the fall of 1944, however, Justice Jackson’s judicial and constitutional ac-
quiescence to race-based military measures against U.S. citizens had ceased.  
When the justices met in conference on October 16, 1944, to discuss and vote on 
the Korematsu case, Jackson told his colleagues that he “stop[ped] with Hiraba-
yashi” and would go no further.5  Two months later, when the Court announced 
 
 3. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 4. Dennis J. Hutchinson, “The Achilles Heel” of the Constitution: Justice Jackson and the Japanese 
Exclusion Cases, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 455, 462-476.  So too in Ex Parte Quirin, argued and decided even 
earlier, when Jackson had been on the Court only one year, in which he belatedly joined Chief Justice 
Stone’s opinion upholding the military tribunal procedure by which undercover Nazi agents, appre-
hended on U.S. soil, were swiftly tried, convicted, and punished (including six executions).  See 317 U.S. 
1 (1942). 
 5. Conference notes of Justice Frank Murphy, “No. 20 [sic], O.T. 1944,” in Murphy Papers, Uni-
versity of Michigan, Box 133, quoted in PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 322 (1983); accord THE 
SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 687-91 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) (using various Justices’ notes to recreate 
their conference discussion in Korematsu).  Interestingly, Jackson indicated earlier, in some notes that 
he jotted after reading briefs in the case, that he was undecided but would “[p]robably reverse” Kore-
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to the public its decision upholding Fred Korematsu’s criminal conviction for 
violating the military’s exclusion order, Jackson announced his dissent through 
an opinion that included one of the ringing principles of our nation and our 
constitutional law: 
[I]f any fundamental assumption underlies our system, it is that guilt is personal and 
not inheritable. . . . But here is an attempt to make an otherwise innocent act a crime 
merely because this prisoner is a son of parents as to whom he had no choice, and be-
longs to a race from which there is no way to resign.6 
In his dissent’s classic passage, Jackson explained the malignancy of the ma-
jority decision to uphold the constitutionality of the military orders excluding 
Japanese Americans such as Fred Korematsu from the West Coast: 
[A] judicial construction of the due process clause that will sustain this order is a far 
more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the order itself.  A military or-
der, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the military emergency.  
Even during that period a succeeding commander may revoke it all.  But once a judi-
cial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or 
rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an 
order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in 
criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens.  The principle then lies 
about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward 
a plausible claim of an urgent need.  Every repetition imbeds that principle more 
deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes. . . . A military com-
mander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident.  But if we, 
the Supreme Court, review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of 
the Constitution.  There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will 
be in its image.  Nothing better illustrates this danger than does the Court’s opinion in 
this case.7 
 
*  *  *  *  * 
 
If Justice Jackson’s dissent in Korematsu had said only that, it would be an 
opinion to study and celebrate, but it would not be much of a puzzle or a target 
for continuing criticism.  These words put Jackson on the right side of what is, at 
least from our historical perspective, an easy case.  In this respect, his words 
very much resemble Justice Murphy’s analysis that the wholesale exclusion of 
Japanese Americans from the West Coast was based on unfounded “racial and 
sociological considerations [and thus was] not entitled to the great weight ordi-
narily given the [military] judgments based upon strict military considerations.”8  
And these Jackson words evoke Justice Roberts’s close and scathing parsing of 
 
matsu’s criminal conviction.  Jackson note, “22,” in Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library of Congress, 
Manuscript Division (hereinafter “RHJ Papers”), Box 132. 
 6. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 243-44 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 7. Id. at 245-46. 
 8. See id. at 239-40 (Murphy, J., dissenting).  Murphy called the Court’s opinion a “legalization of 
racism” and described racial discrimination as “utterly revolting among a free people who have em-
braced the principles set forth in the Constitution of the United States.”  Id. at 242. 
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the contradictory military orders that simultaneously confined Fred Korematsu 
to, and excluded him from, the California area in which he lived.9 
These words were, however, only the first part of Jackson’s Korematsu dis-
sent.  The second part is, especially when juxtaposed with his first part, the puz-
zler, because it expressed pessimism about a civilian court’s ability and will to 
enforce constitutional limits on exercises of military power in wartime.  Because 
Jackson thought it was predictable, and indeed almost certain, that the judiciary 
would defer to the military whenever individuals challenged its wartime actions, 
he all but urged courts to treat as non-justiciable any citizen’s claim that a war-
time military action was unconstitutional.  As Professor Patrick Gudridge put it 
recently, Jackson seemed to be arguing in this latter portion of his Korematsu 
dissent “that constitutional law would have been better served if the Supreme 
Court ha[d] not addressed” the constitutionality of the military exclusion orders 
“at all.”10  This aspect of Jackson’s dissent troubled those who focused on it at 
the time of the decision.  It also troubled Jackson, then and during the years he 
lived after Korematsu.  And it remains troubling today as we think about the 
Constitution and how it does or does not constrain the national war powers it 
ostensibly addresses. 
This second part of Jackson’s dissent in Korematsu begins by describing two 
circumstances that he saw as fixed realities: (1) in the civilian legal process, 
judges, such as Jackson and his Supreme Court colleagues, lack the martial 
competence needed to determine the actual military necessity of wartime ac-
tions by commanders such as Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, who headed 
the Army’s Western Defense Command from 1939 until June 1943 and who, in 
1942, ordered Japanese Americans excluded from the West Coast;11 and (2) ci-
 
 9. See id. at 225-33 (Roberts, J., dissenting).  Justice Roberts called these contradictory military 
orders, violations of which each constituted a federal misdemeanor, “nothing but a cleverly devised 
trap to accomplish the real purpose of the military authority, which was to lock [Korematsu] up in a 
concentration camp.”  Id. at 232. 
In Ex parte Endo, in which the Court held, on the same day on which it upheld in Korematsu the 
constitutionality of military exclusion orders, that there was no legal authority for the government to 
detain a loyal Japanese American citizen of the United States based only on her race, Justices Murphy 
and Roberts each filed a separate opinion stating bluntly that such detention was as unconstitutional as 
were the military orders that had excluded persons like Ms. Endo and Mr. Korematsu from their West 
Coast home areas.  See 323 U.S. 283, 307-08, 308-10 (1944) (Murphy, J., & Roberts, J., concurring).  Jus-
tice Jackson, by contrast, who initially drafted for himself (it being his habit to start drafting an opinion 
for himself as he thought about cases) a short opinion on the unconstitutionality of detaining United 
States citizens “in camps without conviction of crime,” Jackson three-page typescript opinion, “Endo,” 
in RHJ Papers, Box 133, reprinted in Patrick O. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933, 
1969-70 (2003), ultimately decided simply to join Justice Douglas’s opinion for the Endo Court.  (Pro-
fessor Gudridge’s article is an intriguing argument that Endo’s condemnation of the detention camps 
was based in constitutional law, not merely on narrow statutory and Executive order interpretations, 
and that we should understand and commemorate Endo as such.) 
 10. Gudridge, supra note 9, at 1933. 
 11. See generally IRONS, supra note 5.  General DeWitt also selectively issued exclusion and reloca-
tion orders to non-Japanese American citizens of the United States who lived within his command re-
gion.  For an odd and somewhat entertaining account of one such order, which resulted in the court-
martial of a U.S. citizen and soldier of Italian ethnic heritage who ultimately was acquitted, see REMO 
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vilian courts—at least those that recognize their incompetence to second-guess 
the military about national security matters in wartime—would thus defer, quite 
properly, to a commander’s “military necessity” claim. 
Jackson explained these practical realities in his dissenting opinion: 
The limitation under which courts always will labor in examining the necessity for a 
military order are illustrated by this case.  How does the Court know that these orders 
have a reasonable basis in necessity?  No evidence whatever has been taken by this or 
any other court.  There is sharp controversy as to the credibility of the DeWitt [final] 
report [explaining the military basis for removing Japanese Americans from the West 
Coast in 1942.]  So the Court, having no real evidence before it, has no choice but to 
accept General DeWitt’s own unsworn, self-serving statement, untested by any cross-
examination, that what he did was reasonable.  And thus it will always be when courts 
try to look into the reasonableness of a military order. 
In the very nature of things, military orders are not susceptible of intelligent judicial 
appraisal.  They do not pretend to rest on evidence, but are made on information that 
often would not be admissible and on assumptions that could not be proved.  Informa-
tion in support of an order could not be disclosed to courts without danger that it 
would reach the enemy.  Neither can courts act on communications made in confi-
dence.  Hence courts can never have any real alternative to accepting the mere decla-
ration of the authority that issued the order that it was reasonably necessary from a 
military viewpoint.12 
For readers looking to embrace Justice Jackson’s eloquent condemnation of 
the military’s racist exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast, his 
confession of civilian judicial incompetence to determine whether this wartime 
military measure actually was necessary and his resulting call for court defer-
ence to military claims of necessity were not the end of the bad news.  Jackson 
went on to predict, in effect, that civilian judges never would presume to declare 
a wartime military measure unconstitutional, and that this reality counseled 
against courts even embarking to review such cases in the first place: 
I would not lead people to rely on this Court for a review that seems to me wholly de-
lusive.  The military reasonableness of these orders can only be determined by military 
superiors. . . . 
My duties as a justice as I see them do not require me to make a military judgment as 
to whether General DeWitt’s evacuation and detention program was a reasonable 
military necessity.  I do not suggest that the courts should have attempted to interfere 
with the Army in carrying out its task.13 
In other words, having announced, in the first part of the opinion, constitu-
tional condemnation of the military’s racist exclusion orders, what Jackson ar-
ticulated in this second part of his opinion was a prescription for civilian courts 
to abstain from reviewing the constitutionality of military action during war-
time. 
Justice Jackson’s Korematsu dissent contained a third argument—an impor-
tant one, for it was the basis on which he was, at the bottom line, dissenting and 
 
BOSIA, THE GENERAL AND I 36-37, 74, 102 (1971) (personalizing his battles with General DeWitt but 
admitting that he never met the man). 
 12. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 13. Id. at 248. 
06_BARRETT_FIXED PROOFS.DOC 11/22/2005  11:32 AM 
Spring 2005] JUSTICE JACKSON’S KOREMATSU DISSENT 63 
dissenting alone.  “I should hold,” Jackson wrote, “that a civil court cannot be 
made to enforce an order which violates constitutional limitations even if it is a 
reasonable exercise of military authority.”14  At the very end of his opinion, he 
repeated this idea:  “I do not think [the civil courts] may be asked to execute a 
military expedient that has no place in law under the Constitution.  I would re-
verse the judgment and discharge the prisoner.”15 
Although Jackson declared this ultimate position bluntly, he did very little 
to explain or develop it.  Yet it actually was the key turn in his dissent, for it was 
the argument that explained why he was not concurring in the Court’s result—
that Fred Korematsu was, in law, a criminal—or joining his dissenting col-
leagues in reasoning that the military exclusion order was unconstitutional.  
What Jackson was stating, very tersely, was that for him it would make no dif-
ference if a civilian court could somehow determine, with competence, that a 
race-based exclusion order was reasonable in military terms.  Even then, he be-
lieved, a civilian court could not, constitutionally, assist the military in enforcing 
an order that is racially discriminatory on its face—its blatant racism made it, 
for courts, legally, constitutionally, and judicially untouchable.  In any such ven-
ture, Jackson was announcing, the military would have to do its deeds on its 
own, without judicial assistance or imprimatur.16 
 
*  *  *  *  * 
 
The second part of Justice Jackson’s Korematsu dissent—his argument that 
courts probably should abstain from deciding constitutional challenges to mili-
tary policy judgments in wartime—contained many messages.  At the level of 
the particular case, he seemed to be castigating the Court (including his earlier 
self, for he had voted to grant Fred Korematsu’s petition seeking a writ of cer-
tiorari17) for having agreed to review the constitutionality of this criminal con-
viction for violating a military order of exclusion.  More generally, Jackson 
seemed to be advising prospective litigants not to seek judicial protection from 
unconstitutional military actions.  Perhaps he also was lobbying his Court col-
 
 14. Id. at 247. 
 15. Id. at 248. 
 16. Judge Richard Posner, who views Jackson generally, and admiringly, as “one of the greatest 
pragmatic Justices,” has described this closing strand of his Korematsu dissent as a “surprising” disap-
pointment because Jackson there failed to understand that, in Posner’s view, the military’s exclusion 
order “did not violate any hard-edged rule of constitutional law.”  RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, 
PRAGMATISM & DEMOCRACY 293, 294 (2003).  Interestingly, Judge Posner did not address, in this 
book advocating pragmatic judging, the second, utterly pragmatic, part of Jackson’s Korematsu dissent: 
his argument that courts should abstain from reviewing the constitutionality of wartime actions that the 
military claims are necessary because the courts are destined, in the end, simply to approve those ac-
tions anyway, debasing constitutional law in the process. 
 17. See Justice Douglas’s secretary’s notes on the Justices’ conference votes on Korematsu’s peti-
tion seeking a writ of certiorari, in William O. Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Divi-
sion, Box 113.  In addition to Jackson, the other Justices who voted to grant Korematsu’s petition for a 
writ of certiorari were Rutledge, Murphy, Douglas, Frankfurter, Reed, and Roberts.  Justice Black 
voted to deny the petition and Chief Justice Stone did not participate in the vote.  See id. 
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leagues to avoid future cases of this type.  (In this, Jackson’s view might have 
been institutionally pragmatic—he may have been, despite his stance as a dis-
senter on the merits, viewing the Court majority’s decision to give its constitu-
tional blessing to the military’s exclusion orders as, at least implicitly, something 
of a success for the judicial branch because it thereby avoided the potential dis-
aster of being disobeyed.  Jackson was doing this, perhaps, by flagging very sub-
tly—and fearing—the possibility of a future case in which the Supreme Court 
actually might strike down a wartime military order as unconstitutional, only to 
provoke Executive branch disobedience and thus an inter-branch constitutional 
conflict that the Court would necessarily lose, at least in the short term, because 
it lacks the practical power to enforce its commands.)  In all of these respects, 
Jackson’s opinion offered license to the Executive branch, including the mili-
tary, and discouragement to those who would look to the Supreme Court to re-
store constitutional limits when other branches have exceeded their war power 
boundaries. 
Jackson’s dissenting opinion drew subtle criticism from within the Court it-
self.  Justice Felix Frankfurter, who was Jackson’s most like-minded colleague 
and closest friend on the Court even at this relatively early point in their tenure 
together (fall 1944 marked the start of their fourth of twelve years as judicial 
brethren), wrote a brief concurring opinion in Korematsu.18  Frankfurter aimed 
a sentence or thought in that opinion at each of the three dissenters, but his 
comment on Jackson’s effort to have it both ways—Jackson declaring his inabil-
ity to say that the military exclusion order was an unreasonable exercise of the 
executive power to wage war, but Jackson nonetheless declaring Korematsu’s 
criminal conviction unconstitutional—was especially barbed and powerful: 
To recognize that military orders are “reasonable expedient military precautions” in 
time of war and yet to deny them constitutional legitimacy makes of the Constitution 
an instrument for dialectic subtleties not reasonably to be attributed to hard-headed 
Framers, of whom a majority had had actual participation in war.  If a military order 
such as that under review does not transcend the means appropriate for conducting 
war, such action by the military is as constitutional as would be any authorized action 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission within the limits of the constitutional power 
to regulate commerce.19 
This passage was a well-aimed, double-barreled shot at Jackson:  the words 
“reasonably expedient military precautions,” which Frankfurter put in quota-
tion marks but did not attribute to a source, came from Jackson’s dissenting 
opinion,20 and the Court’s recent unanimous explanation of the breadth of the 
national power to regulate interstate commerce had the same authorship.21 
 
 18. See 323 U.S. at 224-25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 19. Id. at 225. 
 20. See 323 U.S. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“I cannot say, from any evidence before me, that 
the orders of General DeWitt were not reasonably expedient military precautions, nor could I say that 
they were.  But even if they were permissible military procedures, I deny that it follows that they are 
constitutional.  If, as the Court holds, it does follow, then we may as well say that any military order will 
be constitutional and have done with it.”) (emphasis added). 
 21. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (Jackson, J., for the Court). 
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Although early commentators on Korematsu praised Jackson’s dissent for 
its constitutional condemnation of racism,22 it soon drew barbs from more re-
flective, scholarly readers.  Professor Eugene Rostow, in his now-famous early 
attack on the Supreme Court’s decisions in the Japanese American cases, de-
scribed Jackson’s opinion as “a fascinating and fantastic essay in nihilism.”23  
Some years later, Professor Charles Fairman, a scholar who defended the con-
stitutionality of the military orders excluding Japanese Americans from the 
West Coast during the War and who later became a trusted friend of Jackson, 
told him that his Korematsu dissent—which Fairman read as telling “officers of 
the Executive that in practice, in order to preserve the nation, they may have to 
violate its Constitution”—was “wrong” and urged him to reconsider his narrow 
view of executive power in wartime emergency.24 
As Justice Jackson continued for the rest of his life to think about the issues 
of constitutional law and military power that he had grappled with in Kore-
matsu, he remained convinced that he had, in each step of his complex ap-
proach, done the best he could have done with this problem as a civilian judge.  
His stated reasons for adhering in later years to the approach he had taken in 
Korematsu resembled what he wrote in the dissent itself.  His less obvious (and 
perhaps even less conscious) reasons included knowledge that was more per-
sonal:  his dissent was grounded in, and it was later reconfirmed by, the experi-
ences and practical wisdom of his own life.  Justice Jackson’s Korematsu dissent 
did not explicitly mention “Spring Creek,” “Frewsburg,” “World War I,” 
“Jamestown,” or even “FDR.”  Nor, of course, did it mention “Nuremberg,” for 
in 1944 that undertaking and defining experience was still in Jackson’s unfore-
 
 22. See, e.g., Merlo Pusey, War and Civil Rights, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1944, at 7.  Columnist 
Pusey, writing only a few days after the decision, quoted approvingly and at length from Jackson’s criti-
cisms of majority rationalizations regarding the constitutionality of the military exclusion orders—in 
other words, the first part of Jackson’s dissenting opinion.  Pusey did not, however, address Jackson’s 
judicial futility/abstention argument, which might lead to exactly the same result as the majority’s deci-
sion to affirm Korematsu’s conviction: a military unsupervised and thus unrestrained by judicial review.  
Cf. letter from Judge Jerome N. Frank to Justice Robert H. Jackson (Jan. 5, 1945), in RHJ Papers, Box 
132 (stating “how much I admire your opinion in the Korematsu case” but not discussing, in this one-
sentence private letter, any of its specifics). 
 23. Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 510 (1945). 
 24. Charles Fairman, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 445, 453-54 n.30 
(1955).  This article, a tribute to Jackson that Fairman wrote shortly after Jackson’s premature death, is 
a thorough, and thoroughly admiring, account of Jackson’s judicial work. 
In 1942, in the months immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor, Fairman lived and wrote 
about the exclusion orders in the area where they applied—he then was a political science professor at 
Stanford University.  Fairman then (and later) defended General DeWitt’s “evacuation” orders as rea-
sonable preventative security measures.  See Charles Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the Na-
tional Emergency, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1253, 1301-02 (1942).  Jackson cited to Fairman’s 1942 article and 
also to its sequel, Charles Fairman, The Supreme Court on Military Jurisdiction: Martial Rule in Hawaii 
and the Yamashita Case, 59 HARV. L. REV. 833 (1946), in a major lecture that Jackson wrote and deliv-
ered in 1951.  See Robert H. Jackson, Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 
111 n.21 (1951). 
For the most recent evaluations of Jackson’s Korematsu dissenting opinion, see JOHN M. FERREN, 
SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT: THE STORY OF JUSTICE WILEY RUTLEDGE 250-
51 (2004), and William E. Nelson, Brown v. Board of Education and the Jurisprudence of Legal Real-
ism, 48 ST. L. UNIV. L. REV. 795, 816-17 & n.156 (2004). 
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seeable future.  But the presence and influence of all of these personal experi-
ences on Jackson’s thinking about Korematsu is unmistakable, and the context 
they add gives his words a rational content that may be its greatest, and its most 
humanly optimistic, attribute. 
III 
THE ESSENTIAL JACKSON IN HIS KOREMATSU DISSENT 
Robert Jackson’s earliest forebears came to North America from Europe 
more than one hundred years before his 1892 birth in a family farmhouse in 
northwestern Pennsylvania.  As the nineteenth century became the twentieth, 
Jackson grew up in a clan that valued its independence, first on its isolated 
farmland and then in a small town in southwestern New York State.  As a boy, 
he was educated in rural public schools, as well as through his own listening, 
reading, speaking, and writing.  He worked in various family and community 
businesses, and, as an adult, he became a lawyer who achieved great successes, 
first during twenty years in private practice in western New York State and then 
in a national government career that began after his political mentor and friend 
Franklin Roosevelt became president in 1933. 
Jackson remained true to, and his work always reflected, the shaping influ-
ences of his origins and experiences.  To understand Jackson, including his judi-
cial opinions, look to his life.  To understand Jackson’s dissent in Korematsu, 
look to the life experiences before 1944 that gave him deep understandings both 
of the autonomous individual’s true freedom and personal space in peacetime 
and of the vast and comparatively enormous nature of executive power in na-
tional government, especially during wartime.  As he considered that juxtaposi-
tion—the nature of civilian freedom versus the power of government itself—
Jackson developed a theory and a faith that the power of government could be 
exercised, even in the military realm and even during war, with thoughtful self-
control.  That theory was the basis for his hopefulness and core optimism that 
governmental episodes such as the excesses of West Coast military command 
during World War II were not inevitable and could be controlled, even if the 
means of control could not be the judiciary. 
A. Jackson the Civilian 
Jackson’s upbringing and experiences before he came to Washington in 1934 
were utterly civilian and deeply pacific.  The years of Theodore Roosevelt’s 
presidency (those of Jackson’s rural childhood), the Taft years  (in which Jack-
son was young adult), and Wilson’s first term (when  Jackson became a lawyer) 
were times of great national peace and isolation.  Decades later, as he dictated 
an early draft of one of his notable public lectures, Justice Jackson described his 
milieu and outlook as a young man: 
Our world then was a peaceful world, our Nation unarmed—but unafraid.  [In the re-
gion where I grew up] close to the Canadian border, where a century before war with 
England had been waged, we had come to think of the unfortified frontier between 
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ourselves and our friendly Canadian neighbors as somehow symbolic of the state of 
the world.  We regarded ourselves as living in an age of enlightenment.  Tyranny be-
longed to the middle ages but lingered, of course, in a few countries—such as Russia, 
Germany, and the Austro-Hungarian empire.  We knew they were backward and ty-
rannical governments, for they maintained standing armies and conscripted their 
youth for compulsory military service.  We thanked God that we were not militarists, 
as were they.  We never expected another large-scale war.  The initiative in the world 
was held by the ideas of our Declaration of Independence and our type of constitu-
tionalism.  Its spread in the century that followed Waterloo was the most dramatic 
tendency of that era and thrones went down or granted concessions before its pro-
gress. . . . 
Henley was the poet who caught the spirit of our times with his inspiring lines.  Wil-
liam James, unfettered pragmatist, spoke our philosophy.  Such political divisions as 
we had were represented by the little differences between a Wilson, a Taft and a 
Theodore Roosevelt, who, after all, had much the same outlook on life and bickered 
only as to details.  It was, I assure you, a very comfortable era, one in which life might 
be hard but never hopeless, in which we might contemplate struggle but never defeat.  
We were certain, or now seem to have been certain, that— 
“The year’s at the spring, 
And day’s at the morn: 
God’s in His heaven – 
All’s right with the world!”25 
When war began in Europe in 1914, Jackson was a new lawyer, only twenty-
two years of age.26  Active in politics and public speaking, he took pacifist stands 
and urged U.S. non-involvement in the foreign conflict.  Even in 1917, when 
Jackson’s early political hero Woodrow Wilson obtained the congressional dec-
laration that took the United States into the War, Jackson offered loyal, but 
general and distant, support.  Jackson spoke favorably of President Wilson, but 
while many of Jackson’s contemporaries enlisted in the military, he remained in 
civilian life, practicing law in Jamestown and nearby Buffalo. 
This youthful Jackson is the Justice Jackson who emerged as the Korematsu 
dissenter three decades later.  In his civilian-ness, he considered civilian judges 
like himself incompetent to assess, and deferential when faced with, military 
judgments.  He also understood and sympathized with fellow civilians, such as 
Fred Korematsu, who sought merely to live their lives in peace and free space.  
And he declined judicially, as he had personally in 1917, to enlist—this time in 
President Roosevelt’s and General DeWitt’s military programs for Japanese 
Americans living in the United States. 
 
 25. Robert H. Jackson, typescript draft of his James McCormick Mitchell lecture, n.d. [win-
ter/spring 1951], p. 4, in RHJ Papers, Box 48.  Jackson was quoting lines sung by a little Italian girl 
named Pippa in Robert Browning’s 1841 poem, “Pippa Passes” (part 1, lines 221-28).  Jackson contin-
ued to revise this lecture and, by the time he delivered it at the University of Buffalo on May 9, 1951, it 
no longer included the material quoted above.  The lecture was later published as Robert H. Jackson, 
Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 BUFF. L. REV. 103 (1951). 
 26. See generally JOSEPH E. PERSICO, ELEVENTH MONTH, ELEVENTH DAY, ELEVENTH HOUR: 
ARMISTICE DAY, 1918, WORLD WAR I AND ITS VIOLENT CLIMAX 19, 22 (2004). 
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B. Jackson’s Pre-Korematsu Experiences with Executive Power 
Robert Jackson’s acquaintance with Franklin Roosevelt began in their re-
spective young adulthoods, long before either man was perceived (except by 
their mothers and teachers) as destined for greatness.  They first met in Albany 
when Jackson was about nineteen years old and studying to be a lawyer and 
Roosevelt was twenty-eight or twenty-nine and a freshman state senator.27  Over 
the next thirty years, their stars ascended together.  Jackson benefited consid-
erably from Roosevelt’s highest-rising star, which gave him significant official 
powers, and from his very high regard for his younger friend.  Roosevelt ulti-
mately made Jackson his Solicitor General, then his Attorney General, and 
later a Supreme Court Justice.  If history had taken slightly different turns at 
various points, Jackson might have become Roosevelt’s successor in the White 
House or, at three separate moments, the Chief Justice of the United States.28 
When Jackson joined FDR’s administration in 1934, he served under Roo-
sevelt in metaphorical but very real political “wars” for the rest of that decade.  
In a wide range of realms, Jackson saw, and was part of exercising, determined 
executive power.  Unlike almost all of his later Supreme Court colleagues, Jack-
son was present at ringside in the FDR era—and sometimes in the ring itself—
to see military and command power run up against civilian government in the 
form of the judiciary and against civilian law in the form of the Constitution.  
Jackson saw in his Roosevelt administration years—he knew—what truly gov-
erns, and gives way to, what. 
One particular Roosevelt experience that marked Jackson was being a 
presidential confidante when litigants brought three Supreme Court cases chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the president’s decision to take the United 
States off the gold standard, government contractual commitments notwith-
standing.  Jackson was present with FDR in early 1935 when he learned that the 
Justices had been hostile to the executive-branch position during oral argument.  
Jackson witnessed, was involved in preparing to implement, and never forgot, 
the President’s determination to announce publicly, in the event of adverse Su-
preme Court decisions, that he would act in the national interest to flout the 
Court’s rulings.29 
In 1940, as President Roosevelt moved this isolationist country carefully but 
steadily toward involvement in the European war that would become World 
War II, he made Jackson his attorney general.  In that position, Jackson, still a 
civilian in his core sense of himself, became an attorney general whose primary 
 
 27. See generally ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER’S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT 2-3 (John Q. Barrett ed., 2003). 
 28. Three Presidents contemplated appointing Jackson when they had opportunities to fill the chief 
justiceship:  President Roosevelt in 1941, following the resignation of Chief Justice Hughes; President 
Truman in 1946, following the death of Chief Justice Stone; and President Eisenhower in 1953, follow-
ing the death of Chief Justice Vinson. 
 29. See Jackson, supra note 27, at 65-66. 
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legal work addressed war preparation and related issues.30  Jackson worked with 
the President and the War Department to accomplish increased military sup-
port for Great Britain, including the “Destroyer Deal” that navigated legal 
complexities and evaded congressional approval to provide vital assistance 
when Britain stood alone against Hitler in summer and fall 1940.  Roosevelt or-
dered a reluctant Jackson to assume responsibility to oversee management of 
immigration affairs and border security, to resume Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion wiretapping of suspected threats to national security, to implement the new 
alien registration law, to supervise FBI investigations of suspected enemy aliens 
from Germany and Italy who were then in the United States, and to prepare to 
arrest specified individuals from those groups if and when the United States and 
their nations of origin actually went to war.31 
Jackson’s pre-Supreme Court experience with President Roosevelt’s deter-
mination as a military commander concluded with a major event that occurred 
just south of downtown Los Angeles.  In June 1941, Jackson was still attorney 
general when President Roosevelt sent 20,000 soldiers marching into Ingle-
wood, California to take over the North American Aviation Company’s aircraft 
production facility.  At the president’s command, the Army takeover kept the 
company operating when labor disputes would otherwise have halted the pro-
duction lines that were turning out the B-25 bombers that later played vital 
roles in the Pacific theater of World War II.32 
In 1944, Justice Jackson argued in the second part of his Korematsu dissent 
that civilian courts probably should abstain from assessing military actions dur-
ing wartime because courts that engage in such reviews ultimately will give their 
approval to military actions, thus sometimes creating bad constitutional law and 
 
 30. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME, FROM THE 
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 280-86 (2004). 
 31. One cryptic but striking example of the last is a handwritten note that President Roosevelt jot-
ted and apparently gave to Attorney General Jackson, likely in spring 1941, during one of their many 
conversations about dealing with the threat of enemy aliens inside the United States: 
  1.  Overstay alien–Can’t just go back. 
       no country or transportation. 
  (a)  Send to Lisbon 
             or Japan or China. 
  (b)  Keep here but report 
        once a month. 
  2.  Criminal–Jail. 
  3.  Resisters–non criminal. 
      Set up a camp. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt handwritten note, n.d., in RHJ Papers, Box 90.  In the Library of Congress, this 
FDR note is in a file containing Jackson’s attorney general papers on the subject of issues concerning 
“Immobilized Foreign Ships.” 
 32. See EDWARD S. GREENBAUM, A LAWYER’S JOB: IN COURT–IN THE ARMY–IN THE OFFICE 
137-41 (1967) (describing his role as War Department representative on the scene of the Army take-
over of the North American Aviation bomber production plant in Inglewood, California); Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 648-49 &  n.17 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring in the judg-
ment and in the opinion of the Court) (discussing President Roosevelt’s and the Army’s seizure of the 
North American Aviation plant and Jackson’s involvement in those events as attorney general). 
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always leaving the military unregulated.  This pragmatic perspective palpably 
reflects Jackson’s direct pre-Court career knowledge of the quantity, mentality, 
and determination of executive—including military—power and commanders. 
C. Jackson on Power and Reason 
Robert Jackson developed and succeeded through a long run of practical 
experiences: he was a rural farm boy; a diligent student, both in school and on 
his own initiative; an apprentice who learned law from two mentors; a lawyer 
who succeeded because of his skilled advocacy, advising, and writing; a politi-
cian who found the successes that are measured by elections and policy out-
comes; and a figure of national prominence based on accomplished results.  
Every aspect of Jackson’s life was grounded in experience, in the realities of 
getting from here to there.  Things made sense to Jackson when they worked, 
when they did the job at hand, and ideas made least sense to him when they 
proved useless in the farm field, in the community, in the marketplace, in poli-
tics, or in the law.  Pragmatism was Jackson’s framework in his judging, includ-
ing in Korematsu. 
Jackson also was a brilliant, reflective thinker about the experiences he lived 
and observed.  As he made his way, he saw life constantly offering a choice be-
tween two competing forces, two contending approaches, two polar positions.  
At the level of greatest generality, Jackson labeled these poles “power” and 
“reason.”  In specific contexts, he saw them as embodying the differences that 
separate selfish and selfless, majority and minority, group and individual, in-
sider and outsider, expediency and principle, capacity and self-restraint.  Jack-
son regularly described these poles in his speaking and writing, both on and off 
the bench, and they came to be reflected, explicitly and implicitly, in his judicial 
opinions. 
Robert Jackson first spoke formally in the Supreme Court chamber about 
“power” and “reason” and their relevance to constitutional adjudication on 
February 1, 1940, when, as the newly appointed attorney general, he addressed 
the justices on the formal occasion of the Supreme Court’s 150th anniversary.33  
Jackson began his very eloquent speech on this occasion by describing the 
Court in its very early days.  He then discussed how its work had changed as the 
Constitution “became less a living and contemporary thing—more and more a 
tradition.”34  Turning then to the respective work of the Court he was addressing 
and the Executive branch and the bar he was representing, Jackson spoke about 
how the judiciary fits with, and depends upon, the other branches of govern-
ment and the democratic system they reflect: 
However well the Court and its bar may discharge their tasks, the destiny of this Court 
is inseparably linked to the fate of our democratic system of representative govern-
ment.  Judicial functions, as we have evolved them, can be discharged only in that kind 
 
 33. See 309 U.S. v-xii (1939).  With the exception of the newly appointed Justice Murphy, the full 
Court was present.  See id. 
 34. Id. at VI. 
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of society which is willing to submit its conflits to adjudication and to subordinate 
power to reason.  The future of the Court may depend more upon the competence of 
the executive and legislative branches of government to solve their problems ade-
quately and in time than upon the merit which is its own.35 
Five years passed, encompassing his appointment to the Court and many ju-
dicial decisions, including Korematsu, before Jackson returned, again in that 
courtroom, to his touchstone concepts of power and reason.  In May 1945, just 
days after President Truman announced the appointment of Justice Jackson to 
prosecute Nazi war criminals in Europe, Jackson closed a dissenting opinion by 
invoking his polar positions and stating his preference between them:  “Power 
should answer to reason none the less because its fiat is beyond appeal.”36 
Less then six months later, Jackson voiced the same perspective on these 
contending forces and approaches to life as he explained, in his majestic open-
ing statement in the Palace of Justice at Nuremberg, the legal proceedings that 
he had led the Allies to create: 
 May it please Your Honors: 
The privilege of opening the first trial in history for crimes against the peace of the 
world imposes a grave responsibility.  The wrongs which we seek to condemn and pun-
ish have been so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that civilization cannot 
tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot survive their being repeated.  That four 
great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the hand of vengeance 
and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the 
most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason.37 
Jackson continued to voice his perspective on the relative places of power 
and reason, and on the interrelationship between them, after he returned to the 
Court from Nuremberg in 1946.  In his famously stinging Chenery II dissent re-
garding the limits of judicial deference to administrative agency actions, for ex-
ample,38 Jackson penned a two-level reflection on the difference between ac-
 
 35. Id. at VII. 
 36. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161, 196 (1945) 
(Jackson, J., joined by Stone, C.J., and Roberts and Frankfurter, JJ., dissenting); see also Jewell Ridge 
Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 897 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring in 
denial of petition for rehearing).  Jackson’s second, solo opinion in this case went unnoticed by the 
press and general public in the days and months after it was handed down on June 18, 1945, but the 
next spring, following Chief Justice Stone’s April 1946 death, President Truman’s June 1946 appoint-
ment of Chief Justice Vinson to succeed Stone, and Jackson’s ensuing public attack from Nuremberg 
on Justice Black’s ethics, the Jewell Ridge opinions came to be understood as quite revealing of the se-
rious personal divisions among many of the justices. 
 37. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE NÜRNBERG CASE 30 (1947). 
 38. Securities & Exchange Comm. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 210-18 (1947) (Jackson, J., 
joined by Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating, “I give up.  Now I realized fully what Mark Twain meant 
when he said, ‘The more you explain it, the more I don’t understand it’” and stating his inability in this 
case “to comprehend the processes by which other minds reach a given result”).  Earlier, when Justice 
Murphy had delivered the Court’s opinion in this case on June 23, 1947, Justices Frankfurter and Jack-
son had briefly stated their dissent, the lack of time for them to prepare “a response adequate to the 
issues raised by the Court’s opinion . . . concern[ing] the rule of law in its application to the administra-
tive process and the function of the Court in reviewing administrative action,” and their resolve that 
“detailed grounds for dissent will be filed in due course.”  Id. at 209.  Over the ensuing summer, Jack-
son drafted and polished his dissent, which Frankfurter joined and they filed when the Court began its 
new Term on October 6, 1947.  See id. at 210. 
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tions that reflect mere power and those that are grounded in reason:  he con-
demned an administrative agency for exercising its power without offering any 
reasons for its action,39 and he condemned the Supreme Court for changing its 
previous approach to this very case four years earlier simply because a new 
Court majority now had the power to do so.40  Jackson also implicitly employed 
the power/reason dialectic, to cite just one more example, when he coined the 
phrase “neutral and detached magistrate” to explain the core of the Fourth 
Amendment’s Warrant Clause protection for civilian liberties.41 
Power and reason also continued to be present in Jackson’s post-Nuremberg 
extrajudicial writing.  One of the very final projects that he worked on before 
his sudden death in October 1954 was drafting the Edwin Lawrence Godkin lec-
tures he had agreed to deliver at Harvard University in February 1955.  In those 
drafts, which Justice Jackson prepared during the summer and early fall of 1954, 
he made explicit the relationship he saw between Korematsu and his views on 
power and reason.  After describing the Supreme Court majority’s Korematsu 
decision quite generously as an instance of the judiciary deferring to the mili-
tary’s view of what best served ultimate liberty,42 Jackson concluded his final 
draft lecture by quoting from his own 1941 speech on the occasion of the 
Court’s’ sesquicentennial.  “‘Judicial functions, as we have evolved them’” in 
the United States, Jackson reiterated, 
“can be discharged only in that kind of society which is willing to submit its conflicts to 
adjudication and to subordinate power to reason.  The future of the Court may de-
pend more upon the competence of the executive and legislative branches of govern-
ment to solve their problems adequately and in time than upon the merit which is its 
own.”43 
When Jackson’s Godkin lectures were published posthumously in 1955, this ar-
ticulation of the human potential to subordinate power to reason became liter-
ally his final public words on law itself. 
 
 39. Id. at 216 (“The truth is that in this decision the Court approves the Commission’s assertion of 
power to govern the matter without law, power to force surrender of stock so purchased [i.e., by corpo-
rate officers and directors after they had filed a voluntary reorganization plan] whenever it will, and 
power also to overlook such acquisitions if it chooses.  The reasons which will lead it to take one course 
as against the other remain locked in its own breast, and it has not and apparently does not intend to 
commit them to any rule or regulation.  This administrative authoritarianism, this power to decide 
without law, is what the Court seems to approve in so many words . . . .”). 
 40. Id. at 209-10 (“The Court by this present decision sustains the identical administrative order 
which only recently it held invalid. . . . There being no change in the order, no additional evidence in 
the record and no amendment of relevant legislation, it is clear that there has been a shift in attitude 
between that of a controlling membership of the Court when the case was first here and that of those 
who have the power of decision in this second review.”). 
 41. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (Jackson, J., for the Court).  See generally Hon. 
Albert M. Rosenblatt, Speech at the Annual Conference and Banquet of the New York State Magis-
trates Association (Oct. 5, 2004), in 44 THE MAGISTRATE 4-5 (Dec. 2004) (describing Jackson’s coinage 
in Johnson of the “neutral and detached magistrate” formulation, and concluding, “I cannot think of 
better words that identify what the public expects of judges than neutral and detached.”). 
 42. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 
75, 92 n.92 (1955). 
 43. Id. at 82-83 (quoting 309 U.S. v, vii (1939)). 
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What Jackson stood for and believed to his core, in other words, was that 
power can be exercised, but that reason sometimes, and nonetheless, declines to 
do so. 
D. Jackson’s Optimism 
What civilian Justice Jackson really recognized and described candidly in 
Korematsu was the power of the Executive branch, in the form of General 
DeWitt’s orders and in general, and the powerlessness of the Supreme Court in 
comparison.  Jackson also suspected strongly that DeWitt’s directives reflected 
less than the thinking, judgment, and restraint that reason makes possible.  But 
these insights did not reduce Jackson to pessimism.  While he believed he could 
do little about it from the bench, Jackson’s dissent gave hopeful voice to the 
prospects that reason could, from within the realm of government and military 
power itself, make its impact.  He explicitly held out the prospect that reason 
could play its reflective, self-restraining role inside the military itself, in the per-
sons of military officers and the Chief Executive who commands them: 
If the people ever let command of the war power fall into irresponsible and unscrupu-
lous hands, the courts wield no power equal to its restraint.  The chief restraint upon 
those who command the physical forces of the country, in the future as in the past, 
must be their responsibility to the political judgments of their contemporaries and to 
the moral judgments of history.44 
In other words, Jackson’s seemingly pessimistic dissent came to a hopeful con-
clusion about our commanders-in-chief and military commanders:  We get to 
elect, and thus to change, the former.  And the latter, Jackson knew, need not 
behave, and they need not exercise their powers, as General DeWitt had. 
In his Nuremberg experience soon after Korematsu, Jackson got to be, and 
he got to see a number of military officers being, the kinds of Executive-branch 
actors who were the hope of his dissenting opinion. 
IV 
JACKSON AFTER KOREMATSU 
A. Jackson at Nuremberg 
Although Justice Jackson never became President or Chief Justice, he did, 
shortly after Roosevelt’s death but pursuant to his design, become a historical 
category of one: Jackson was the chief American prosecutor at Nuremberg, 
Germany, following the Allied military victory in Europe.  Justice Jackson ac-
cepted President Truman’s assignment less than five months after Jackson had 
read his Korematsu dissent from the Supreme Court bench.  He absented him-
self from the Court and went, first to England and ultimately to Nuremberg, to 
bring law and due process to the wreckage and criminal perpetrators of war.  
Indeed, Jackson in 1945 and 1946 was the architect of the post-war international 
 
 44. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
06_BARRETT_FIXED PROOFS.DOC 11/22/2005  11:32 AM 
74 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 68:57 
legal system in which surviving Nazi leaders and other alleged war criminals in 
the European theater were charged, prosecuted, defended, judged, and, for 
those who were convicted, punished.45 
It was well recognized in 1945 that Justice Jackson, in going to do what we 
now summarize as “Nuremberg,” was embarking on a military task.  The mili-
tary defeat of Germany, its subsequent unconditional surrender, and the Allied 
military occupation of Europe was the context for his work.  As Jackson put it 
directly in his closing statement, the Nuremberg trial occurred during a state of 
war.46  He devised, with Allied counterparts, a trial system and structure that 
was an international military tribunal.  And it is semantically interesting to note 
that while Jackson was engaged in this diplomatic, organizational, and, at Nur-
emberg, prosecutorial work, he had for the first time in his life the experience of 
being a military officer—the President, through the War Department, gave 
Jackson the assimilated rank of a senior general, which gave him command au-
thority and administrative power in the American sector of occupied Germany. 
More substantively, what Jackson did at Nuremberg in the trial process he 
designed and in his prosecution of the American cases against Nazi individuals 
and organizations was to exercise some of the reason and something less than 
the full power that a military position embodies.  His core vision and accom-
plishment at Nuremberg was to insist on a real trial—meaning due process and 
the genuine possibility of acquittal, as happened in some cases.  He refused to 
conduct a trial in form that really would have been Executive action dispatching 
vanquished adversaries to predetermined fates. 
Jackson had, before both Nuremberg and Korematsu, given voice to the rea-
son-based view of the legal process that they have in common:  the real judicial 
function, he explained, is to provide a judgment on law and evidence.47  In Ko-
rematsu, this view became Jackson’s skepticism about judges permitting them-
selves to be used militarily when they cannot or will not provide judgments on 
law and evidence.  At Nuremberg, this view animated Jackson’s confident crea-
tion of an independent tribunal and contributed to his comfort about prosecut-
ing before such a court.  He, as the Executive branch and military leader at 
 
 45. See generally TELFORD TAYLOR, ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL 
MEMOIR (1992); EUGENE C. GERHART, AMERICA’S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON (1958). 
 46. See JACKSON, supra note 37, at 121-22: 
[W]e should not overlook the unique and emergent character of this body as an International 
Military Tribunal.  It is no part of the constitutional mechanism of internal justice of any of 
the [London Agreement] Signatory nations.  Germany has unconditionally surrendered, but 
no peace treaty has been signed or agreed upon.  The Allies are still technically in a state of 
war with Germany, although the enemy’s political and military institutions have collapsed.  As 
a Military Tribunal, it is a continuation of the war effort of the Allied nations. 
See also Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 147 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“We are still 
technically in a state of war . . . [and] I find no reason to conclude that we could find fairly that the pre-
sent state of war is merely technical.  We have armies abroad exercising our war power and have made 
no peace terms with our allies, not to mention our principal enemies.”). 
 47. See Cleavages Widen in U.S., Jackson Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1944, at M4 (reporting on and 
quoting Jackson’s speech the previous day to the New York State Bar Association). 
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Nuremberg, went into that court because he wanted, and he was electing to 
permit, real judgment on law and evidence by the judges. 
Korematsu also connects to Nuremberg in Jackson’s own rhetoric and im-
agery.  He surely had his Korematsu dissent in mind when he wrote and then 
spoke, in his Nuremberg summation, the charge that the defendants had given 
Adolf Hitler a “loaded gun.”48 
B. Jackson and the Military 
Jackson’s work during his time at Nuremberg included regular interactions 
and substantive discussions with his American military peers, including Gener-
als Dwight Eisenhower, William J. Donovan, Lucius Clay, and others.  Private 
papers indicate that among the topics Jackson explicitly discussed and reflected 
on while working on the military-power side of the divide were the military is-
sues and policies that had produced Korematsu. 
One of these moments occurred on paper.  In spring 1945, just days after 
President Truman had assigned Jackson to the task of prosecuting Nazi war 
criminals, he received a letter from an American soldier who was fighting in the 
Pacific.  He described his combat and other experiences fighting Japanese mili-
tary forces during the previous seventeen months.  He then explained that he 
was a “former attorney” who was receiving West publishing company’s Su-
preme Court Reporter, and that he recently had received and read Korematsu.  
This soldier let the civilian Jackson know, from the battlefield, that he had got-
ten it right: 
 When I finished reading [the Court’s opinion], I was so shocked. . . . 
 As a member of the armed forces I am in fullest sympathy with any broad reading 
of the war powers of the government.  We in the battle realize full well, perhaps better 
than those of you at home, how much is dependent on centralized leadership.  Indeed, 
many of us are perhaps too ready to utilize the concept of “military necessity” as a jus-
tification for the government exercising powers which may help in shortening the war.  
Because we are in the last resort a group of young men who wish to end the bloody 
battles and return to the States to resume our place in society.  Our selfish interests, it 
might be said, support that which will help us defeat the enemy. 
 But the instant decision is the type of blow from which we cannot recover so easily.  
It introduces racialism, the very racialism we are fighting so strenuously to eliminate.  
 
 48. Jackson’s summation regarding the conspiracy charge against Nuremberg defendants included 
the following paragraph: 
What these men have overlooked is that Adolf Hitler’s acts are their acts.  It was these men 
among millions of others, and it was these men leading millions of others, who built up Adolf 
Hitler and vested in his psychopathic personality not only innumerable lesser decisions but the 
supreme issue of war or peace.  They intoxicated him with power and adulation.  They fed his 
hates and aroused his fears.  They put a loaded gun in his eager hands.  It was left to Hitler to 
pull the trigger, and when he did they all at that time approved.  His guilt stands admitted, by 
some defendants reluctantly, by some vindictively.  But his guilt is the guilt of the whole dock 
and every man in it. 
JACKSON, supra note 37, at 153.  Although press accounts at the time highlighted Jackson’s “loaded 
gun” metaphor, see, e.g., Death Asked for Nazi Leaders [sic], Guilty as Hitler, Says Jackson, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 27, 1946, at 4, I have found none that connected this Jackson “loaded gun” at Nuremberg 
to the “loaded weapon” that he had had warned against in Korematsu. 
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The Supreme Court in recent years—at least from the scattering reading I have been 
able to do in the jungles and tropics—has been preaching religious tolerance.  It has 
declared invalid the “flag-salute” statutes; it has struck down discrimination against 
Negroes in the South: all laudatory let us admit.  To be sure, these cases failed to in-
volve the war power and are not strictly analogous.  But the spirit behind the decisions 
is certainly pertinent.  In deciding the [Fred] Toyosaburo Korematsu cases, the Court 
has however deprived an American citizen of his rights utterly devitalizing the consti-
tutional principles which are included within the word “citizen.” 
 To you and the other Justices who dissented from the majority, whose specious rea-
soning is hardly deserving of criticism except as to reveal the evils lurking in it, let me 
convey my thanks and the thanks of many others for exposing the vicious doctrine 
which is being engrafted onto our constitutional structure.49 
Another of these moments occurred on April 15, 1946.  At that time, at a 
point in the defense cases at Nuremberg when Jackson was not personally han-
dling the cross-examination of any witness, he made a side trip to Austria.  He 
met there with General Mark Clark, who had commanded the American 5th 
Army in the War’s Italian campaign and was at that time American High 
Commissioner in occupied Austria.  They met at Clark’s headquarters in Vi-
enna.  Among the various topics that he and Jackson discussed in detail, in ad-
dition to the Nuremberg trial, was General John DeWitt and the orders he had 
issued four years earlier as military commander of the American West Coast.  
General Clark told Jackson of his 1942 opposition to DeWitt’s orders deporting 
Japanese Americans to inland areas and camps.50  Clark reported that, in his 
view, it would have been militarily sufficient in 1942 to detain only Japanese 
American leaders, while moving others back from coastal areas but letting them 
live normally.  Clark also reported to Jackson that the Japanese American 100th 
Infantry Battalion, which had fought under Clark in Italy, had been loyal and 
effective soldiers.51 
The point is not that General Clark’s views were perfectly correct or 
enlightened, either in 1942 or in 1946.  The point is that “General” Jackson 
found confirmation in Europe, as he spoke in confidence with a real general, 
that all generals are not General John DeWitt, that a military perspective does 
not always insist that power be exercised fully, and that reason can lead to self-
restraint in a military commander’s decisionmaking.  Jackson’s experiences, 
with Clark and others as with his own powers as U.S. Chief of Counsel, cor-
 
 49. Letter from 1st Lt. (Air Corps) Felix F. Stumpf to Justice Jackson (Apr. 18, 1945), in RHJ Pa-
pers, Box 132.  Jackson, swamped with juggling his end-of-Term Supreme Court work with his new 
presidential assignment, scrawled “Acknowledge with thanks R.H.J.” on the letter and later signed a 
very short note, composed by his secretary, that thanked the writer and said Jackson was interested in 
his views.  See letter from Justice Jackson to Lieutenant Felix F. Stumpf (May 5, 1945), in RHJ Papers, 
Box 132. 
 50. See generally PETER IRONS, supra note 5, at 51, 61 (reporting Clark’s February 1942 testimony 
to a congressional committee that the U.S. Pacific coast was well-defended, and his advice to Secretary 
of War Henry Stimson that he (Clark) disapproved of the “mass exodus” proposed by General 
DeWitt). 
 51. See generally MARK W. CLARK, CALCULATED RISK 220-21, 418 (1950) (“I was proud to have 
them in the Fifth Army,” and further describing the 100th Battalion, the first Japanese American unit in 
the U.S. Army, as high-performing, brave, skilled, and highly decorated.). 
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roborated his Korematsu belief that military commanders with all their power in 
the horrible realm of war nonetheless can find it in their own rational capacities 
to do something less than their full powers would allow and their fears might 
otherwise lead them to perpetrate. 
V 
JACKSON ON KOREMATSU 
Following Nuremberg, Justice Jackson returned to the Supreme Court in 
fall 1946.  He served with skill and distinction, especially in wielding his own 
pen to write opinions that expressed strong, often personal, perspectives in 
uniquely eloquent prose, until his sudden death at age 62 in October 1954.52  
During those years, Jackson openly discussed Korematsu and reaffirmed his 
conviction regarding the approaches—certainly the approach to protecting civil 
liberties, and less so the approach to defining judicial power—that he had taken 
in his 1944 opinion. 
A. Jackson on Korematsu as a Civil Liberties Decision 
Justice Jackson always viewed Korematsu as a civil liberties decision.  In a 
major public speech, “Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law,” that he de-
livered in May 1951, a time when the United States was involved in the Korean 
War and Cold War combats against global communism, Jackson described the 
Court’s opinion as “the precedent that I fear will long be most useful to justify 
wartime invasions of civil liberties.”53  His own dissent, by contrast, was one of 
the statements about constitutional civil liberties in which he retained true 
pride.  When a Smith College senior wrote to ask him, for example, about “civil 
liberty cases in which you have rendered an opinion,” Jackson jotted a list of 
nine case names in the margin of her letter for his secretary to use in composing 
a reply for Jackson to sign—the first of these cases being “Korematsu.”54 
B. Jackson on His Korematsu Approach to Executive and Judicial Power 
Justice Jackson also confronted, in private reflection and writing, and then 
in public speaking, the tougher part of his dissenting opinion in Korematsu.  
Jackson delivered “Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law” to a large crowd 
at the University of Buffalo, a school with which he had long and deeply per-
sonal connections.55  The speech, which he drafted personally and rewrote many 
 
 52. See generally Philip B. Kurland, Robert H. Jackson, in IV THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 1283-1311 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1997); Fairman, Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court, supra note 24. 
 53. Jackson, supra note 25. 
 54. Letter from Judith Plesser to Justice Jackson (Sept. 30, 1952), in RHJ Papers, Box 18; accord 
letter from Elsie L. Douglas to Judith Plesser (Oct. 6, 1952), in RHJ Papers, Box 18 (alphabetizing 
Jackson’s list of cases). 
 55. See John Q. Barrett, A Jackson Portrait for Jamestown, “A Magnet in the Room,” 50 BUFF. L. 
REV. 809, 810-11 (2002). 
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times before it reached final form, considers many complex historical episodes 
and difficult political and legal topics, including the World Wars, American 
Communists, emergency powers under various foreign constitutions, President 
Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War, the military com-
mission that tried his assassins, the rejection of Lochnerism, and the protection 
of personal rights.  And then Jackson spoke directly about the conundrum of 
Korematsu: 
  I suppose the American people, on whose eternal vigilance liberty ultimately de-
pends, are well agreed that what they want of the courts is that they both preserve lib-
erty and protect security, finding ways to reconcile the two needs so that we do not 
lose our heritage in defending it. 
 The issue that usually comes to the courts, however, is not a clear and simple one 
between security and liberty.  The issue as we get it is more nearly this:  Measures vio-
lative of constitutional rights are claimed to be necessary to security, in the judgment 
of officials who are best in a position to know, but the necessity is not provable by or-
dinary evidence and the court is in no position to determine the necessity for itself.  
What does it do then?  The best study of the impact of such claims upon the judicial 
process during wartime is Korematsu v. United States, the precedent that I fear will 
long be most useful to justify wartime invasions of civil liberty.  It was not a case 
where the Court was asked by a citizen to obstruct execution by military authorities of 
a military order.  It was a case where the Government asked the Court to become, it-
self, the agency to enforce against the citizen, by criminal process, a military policy of 
dubious constitutionality.  That policy was to remove all persons of Japanese ancestry, 
including native born American citizens, from the West Coast and herd them into 
camps in the interior.  When enforcement of that measure came squarely before the 
Supreme Court, three judicial policies were advocated, none of which can be said to 
be wholly satisfying. 
 One view . . . held exclusion and detention of citizens of Japanese ancestry constitu-
tionally valid.  Korematsu, it reasoned, was detained because military authorities 
feared an invasion and felt constrained to take proper security measures.  “The need 
for action was great, and time was short.”  The Court refused to say that the “actions 
were unjustified” and held them constitutional.  Another course . . . refused to yield to 
the doctrine of military necessity and declared the measure “a clear violation of consti-
tutional rights,” let the chips fall where they would.  It seemed to me then, and does 
now, that the measure was an unconstitutional one which the Court should not bring 
within the Constitution by any doctrine of necessity, a doctrine too useful as a prece-
dent.  I thought the courts should not lend themselves to its enforcement and we 
should discharge the prisoner from custody under judicial commitment.  But had the 
military authorities attempted to enforce the measure by their own force and author-
ity, the Court should not attempt active interference, since the West Coast was then a 
proper theater for military operations.  I can add nothing to my dissent in the case, 
though I have to admit that my view, if followed, would come close to a suspension of 
the writ of habeas corpus or recognition of a state of martial law at the time and place 
found proper for military control.56 
C. Robert Jackson and Fred Korematsu 
In his optimistic conclusion, Korematsu was, to Jackson, a case about the ci-
vilian people of the United States.  Jackson saw regular civilians as having a 
kind of front-end, self-governing power to prevent abuses of military power.  It 
 
 56. JACKSON, supra note 24, at 115-16 (footnote deleted). 
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was “the people,” he wrote, who should, and thus in his view presumably could, 
not “ever let command of the war power fall into irresponsible and unscrupu-
lous hands . . . .”57  And it was the prospect that military commanders might care 
about public reaction, “the political judgments of their contemporaries,”58 that 
gave Jackson some hope that these executive branch officials would restrain 
themselves when deciding how to exercise their enormous powers. 
But the case was not, for Jackson, merely about nine civilian justices, nor 
was it only about 120,000 civilians interned in this country and his hope that the 
moral force, the reason, of liberty interests such as theirs could penetrate a mili-
tary power mindset and lead to military self-restraint.  The case also seems to 
have struck Jackson individually at the level of Fred Korematsu, the individual 
litigant. 
Jackson’s opinion seems to articulate this personal identification.  Kore-
matsu’s crime, wrote Jackson, “consists merely of being present in the state 
whereof he is a citizen, near the place where he was born, and where all his life 
he has lived.”59  Jackson’s dissenting opinion does not mention Warren County, 
Pennsylvania, his place of birth and early boyhood, or the adjacent Chautauqua 
County, New York, where he grew up, went to school, raised his family and 
practiced law for more than twenty years.  There can be little doubt, however, 
that Jackson’s deep commitment to citizen Korematsu’s constitutional right not 
to be classified a criminal simply for living where he had lived all his life was 
written with citizen Jackson and his regional roots also clearly in mind. 
This is an identification that was, decades later, reciprocated quite beauti-
fully on that very land of Jackson’s life.  When I first met and had the opportu-
nity to interview Fred Korematsu in Chautauqua County in 2002, he mentioned 
with deep gratitude his lawyers during the War, the people whose reason led 
them to take his side in his legal battle to be a free American.  He mentioned 
first Ernest Besig, the ACLU lawyer who stood by him through his wartime 
trial and appeals.  And then, in a wonderful layman’s statement that captured it 
all, Mr. Korematsu named three others whom he regarded as having been his 
“lawyers”:  Frank Murphy, Owen Roberts, and Robert Jackson.60 
 
 57. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J. dissenting). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 243. 
 60. Interview with Fred Korematsu, at the Robert H. Jackson Center, Jamestown, N.Y. (Sept. 27, 
2002). 
